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Abstract  
 
The role of corporate elites - notably financial elites - has been at the forefront of political 
debates in Western capitalist societies since the start of the Great Recession in 2008. The 
major structural unbalances that had accumulated in Anglo-American economies over the last 
quarter of the 20th century played a key role in the build up to the financial crisis. Taking 
advantage of the mobility of capital, business elites promoted a model of shareholder 
capitalism actively backed up by the state. A process of elite competition took place: financial 
intermediaries acting on behalf of institutional investors marginalized the alliance between 
traditional managerial elites and workers which had been at the heart of the Keynesian 
compromise. This contribution outlines the consequences of the unravelling of the 20th century 
social pact for workers and their families. It concludes by outlining ‘what’s to be done’ to forge 
a 21st century social pact.   
 
Key words: Corporate elites, financial intermediaries, Keynesian compromise, Anglo-American 
capitalism, social pact.  
 
Introduction  
 
The accumulation of major structural imbalances in the Anglo-American model of financial 
capitalism over the last quarter of the 20th century and the early 21st century has been at the 
heart of the Great Recession of post-2008. By the late 1970s, the deregulation and the 
globalisation of financial markets, actively backed up by the state, led to the spread of 
shareholder capitalism in the governance of the firm. As a result, financial intermediaries acting 
on behalf of institutional investors marginalized the alliance between traditional managerial 
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elites and workers at the heart of the post war Keynesian social compromise. Financial elites or, 
to use Pareto’s term (2008), ‘speculators’ started  to rise to elite positions thanks to the 
apparent success of a model of short-term profitability, displacing traditional managerial elites 
associated with the post-war Keynesian social pact. Based on real wages increases, a stable 
employment contract and mass consumption, this social pact provided the economic security 
that had eluded capitalist societies for most of the first half of the 20th century. This era ended 
in the 1980s when the deregulation of financial and labour markets led to the rise of 
‘disconnected capitalism’ where employers could no longer keep their side of the bargain 
(Thompson 2003). 
This article argues that the process of elite competition - especially the rise of finance-oriented 
elites from the late 1970s onwards, first in the US, with the UK rapidly following suit in the 
early 1980s - is crucial for understanding the demise of the Keynesian social pact. This erosion 
must be understood as a cumulative process, with each wave of de-industrialization in the mid-
1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s and 2000s corresponding to a strategy of maximizing 
shareholder value. While new forms of workers protection have emerged (health and safety, 
anti-discrimination, etc.,) the employment relationship has become increasingly individualized, 
fragmented, de-localised and de-materialised, opening up new forms of vulnerability for 
workers (Martinez Lucio and MacKenzie 2004).  
It is clear that the financial crisis has accentuated pre-existing trends towards the casualisation 
of work and the recommodification of labour, with a new management-led offensive (Taylor 
2012). The financial crisis has also laid bare a crisis in the circulation of elites: in Pareto’s terms, 
class I or fox-like residues (based on deceit, fraud, and manipulation) accumulated too heavily 
in economic elites in the 1980s. Recurrent corporate scandals and fraud from the late 1990s 
onwards can be seen as evidence of the decay of the reign of the foxes in the quest for rent-
extraction that characterizes highly innovative and volatile financial markets. Could the current 
financial crisis spell the end of the reign of the foxes?  
This article is divided into three sections. First, it reviews the debates on corporate elites in 
historical perspective, with a particular focus on Pareto’s concept of elites’ circulation and 
conflict. A process of accommodation of workers’ interests took place in both the US and the 
UK, resulting in the post-1945 social settlement. The industrial working class became the main 
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‘bearer’ of the Keynesian compromise, together with the ‘managerial class’- a consequence of 
the separation of management and ownership in advanced capitalist societies (Berle and 
Means 1932). Second, the article examines the changing world of corporate elites associated 
with the spread of shareholder capitalism. The ‘managerial class’ (Burnham 1960, originally 
published in 1941), or the power elite (Mills 1956), which had replaced the old entrepreneurial, 
property based elite, faced increased competition from financial elites from the late 1970s 
onwards. Financial intermediaries are fundamentally different from corporate managers who 
‘have needed to build minimum levels of trust among stakeholders to ensure on-going 
production and productivity growth’ (Appelbaum, Batt and Clark 2012: 4). Appelbaum et al. 
suggest that the intellectual paradigm of employment relations research based on the need for 
managers to accommodate different stakeholders’ interests no longer captures the reality of 
financial capitalism, when reneging on employee-managers contracts can be a source of 
shareholder value. This assumption does not necessarily hold true for all sectors of the 
economy, for instance knowledge-based activities typically require the implementation of high-
road practice to ensure a high level of employee productivity. However, the partial 
displacement of traditional managerial elites by financial intermediaries with no connection 
with the world of employees helps understand the mechanisms underlying the spread of 
management by fear and the erosion of socio-economic rights. Third, the conclusion outlines 
‘what is to be done’ to forge a 21st century social pact.  
 
Managerial corporate elites and the Keynesian social compact  
 
At the turn of the 19th century, the Italian School of Elitists (Michels 1927, Pareto  
1916 and 2008, Mosca 1939), theorized the division between the elite (the ruling class for 
Mosca, the technocratic oligarchs for Michels) and the rest of society. Elite theorists developed 
their ideas, especially Pareto, as a political challenge to Marxist theories of class struggle. A 
neo-Machiavellian, Pareto argued that societies - ‘social organisms’ - were characterized by a 
need to reconcile preservation and combination, i.e. innovation. Economic elites were made of 
two types: rentiers (consolidation or conservation) and speculators (innovation). Economic 
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elites lost their legitimacy precisely because they became increasingly self-reproducing, 
complacent, and mediocre as they no longer recruited talented members from the working 
class. Elites had to remain flexible and open in order to maintain their supremacy. Typically 
new elites remain open for a while, but quickly become complacent again: While, ‘for the time 
being the new elite is flexible and open to all, after victory…the elite becomes more rigid and 
more exclusive’ (Pareto 2008: 86). Another cycle of decline and fall of elites can start again.  
The interwar period was a crucial test of legitimacy for ruling elites. Although Anglo-American 
democratic capitalism was spared the descent into authoritarianism that characterized Spain, 
Italy and Germany, British and American elites remained opposed to forging a compromise 
with the working class, at least until the early 1930s (Higley and Pakulski 2012).  
Challenges to ruling elites and the advent of Keynesianism  
The incapacity to prevent the Great Depression precipitated the decline of ruling British and 
American elites in the interwar period. In particular, financial and political elites excluded the 
working class from the economic policy framework, leading to a chronic lack of demand due to 
stagnating wages and workers insecurity. In contrast to mainstream economist thinking at the 
time, Keynes understood the need to accommodate working class interests to maintain 
aggregate economic demand (Duménil and Lévy 2001, Crouch 2009, Tomlinson 1993 and 1994). 
Although in time economic and political elites came to accept his policy prescriptions as the 
best remedy to safeguard the lifestyles and institutions of the ‘educated bourgeoisie’ (Denis 
2002), this remained a contested process.  
In Britain the City/Bank of England and the Treasury formed an autonomous system capable of 
formulating a hegemonic project - free trade, balanced budgets and adherence to the gold 
standard - that was detrimental to both industrial and working class interests. When the 
second minority Labour government led by Ramsay MacDonald increased public spending in 
order to respond to mass unemployment, London bankers called for drastic economies, 
especially on social benefits (Williamson, 1984). In August 1931, confronted with a speculative 
attack on the pound, MacDonald asked his Cabinet to implement cuts in order to restore 
markets confidence in the pound. MacDonald argued that cuts would help secure the financial 
support of American banks to rescue the pound. This led both Labour and the Trade Union 
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Congress to protest against the ‘bankers ramp’. In 1945, when Labour won its first clear 
election victory, the commitment to full employment, the partial de-commodification of labour 
through the Social Insurance Act (1943), the repeal of the 1927 Trade Union Act (which had 
placed restrictions on the ability of trade unions to strike and picket), the nationalisation of rail, 
coal and mining industries, were all measures that reflected the political interests of the labour 
movement. However, the financial community managed to preserve its core interests. The City 
maintained its self-regulating doctrine: the nationalisation of the Bank was largely symbolic 
(Tomlinson 1994). 
In the US, the era of corporate political hegemony was brought to an end with the financial 
crisis of 1929 and the spread of the Great Depression, when unemployment rose from over 3 
percent in 1929 to a peak of 25 per cent in 1933 (Jenkins and Brent 1989: 895-897). The image 
of financiers was greatly tarnished by the revelations of the Pecora investigation into the 
causes of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The investigation uncovered a wide range of abusive 
practices on the part of banks and bank affiliates (Weinberg 2002, Blyth 2002).  
Throughout the New Deal, a split between rival capitalist blocs became apparent. While a 
moderate business community (retail, commercial banks) accepted the need to guarantee 
some degree of labour de-commodification and collective bargaining (Domhoff 1970, Blyth 
2002), these measures were opposed by a conservative anti-New Deal coalition representing 
heavy industries led by the National Association of Manufacturers and the American Chamber 
of Commerce. Finally, the moderate wing of the business community led by the Committee for 
Economic Development adopted the ideas of automatic stabilizers and negotiation with trade 
unions (Blyth 2002, Mizruchi 2010). The compromise between business and employees was at 
the core of the American version of Keynesianism, consolidating capitalist expansion 
domestically and internationally, while providing workers with economic security and 
increased real wages (Blyth 2002, Reich 2009). This compromise was strengthened during 
World War Two, when union leaders agreed not to strike in exchange of rising wages and low 
unemployment.  
During World War Two, new elite constellations emerged, based on an alliance between the 
military, managers of large corporations, public bureaucracies and trade unionists: these actors 
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were the main beneficiaries of the institutions of war management (Hingley and Pakulski 2012). 
These elites promoted a Keynesian/Fordist compromise that guaranteed economic stability, 
and secured workers participation in exchange of increased wages and social protection in the 
form of the modern welfare state. It was after World War Two that American power elite 
theorists  (Hunter 1953, Mills 1956, Domhoff 1970) identified a coherent corporate community 
forming an inner circle (Useem 1984), organized on a national basis, with banks being core 
institutions connecting disparate directors. The corporate community possessed tremendous 
economic resources which gave them "structural economic power", enabling business leaders 
to dominate government policy through lobbying, campaign finance, appointments to key 
government positions, and a policy-planning network made up of foundations, think tanks, and 
policy-discussion groups (Scott, 2008: 37). According to Domhoff (2010), American business 
elites constituted highly integrated social groups whose members used to be able to transcend 
their own individual interests to promote and safeguard the interests of capitalism at a 
systemic level. Useem (1980, 1984) also found that corporate elites socialized in exclusive 
schools, social clubs, formal associations such as boards of trustees and universities, thus 
allowing for the formation of class cohesion. In sum, elite theorists assumed that there existed 
a symbiosis of interests between industrial and financial capital through interlocking 
directorates, which enabled the business community to act with a single voice (Carroll 2008: 
44-65). Such assumptions, however, understated the ongoing competition between rival elite 
blocks (Poulantzas 1978).  
Shifts in elites allegiance: the erosion of the Keynesian compromise  
By the end of the 1960s, several economic and sociological factors made the Keynesian 
compromise unsustainable. First, in both the US and the UK, the industrial proletariat was in 
decline, being increasingly replaced by the ‘white collar’ class. This posed a serious problem for 
the labour movement as the white collar class was more politically ‘passive’ and more 
culturally tied to capital than blue collar workers (Mills 1951, Crouch 2009). By the 1980s, 
public sector employees had replaced industrial workers as leaders of the union movement in 
both countries (Crouch 2009). Second, British and American industries were facing increasing 
foreign competition from emerging economies such as Japan in the 1970s and China from the 
1980s onwards (Mizruchi 2010). In a dramatic reversal of the Fordist compromise, managers 
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used the argument of foreign competition to rewrite labour contracts, downsize and 
restructure (Boyer 2005, Reich 2009). Third, as inflationary tensions built up following the rise 
in commodity prices in 1973 and 1978, Keynesian full employment policies were abandoned in 
favour of monetary policies based on inflation control. Fourth, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1973 and the return to floating currencies accentuated the mobility of 
financial capital, thus strengthening the ‘privileged position of business’ (Lindblom 1977). Fifth, 
the fraction of the elites who had never accepted the Fordist-Keynesian compromise seized the 
historical moment of the 1970s to accelerate the process of ideological, political and 
intellectual counter-mobilization (Canova 2009, Duménil and Lévy 2002, Crouch 2009). The 
election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1980 confirmed the political 
hegemony of neo-liberalism. Sixth, the gradual deregulation of financial markets - which 
started with the development of Euromarkets in the 1960s and the abandonment of selective 
credit controls in the 1970s - accentuated pressure from financiers for high short-term 
performance, driving downward pressure on top executive tenure (Gospel and Pendleton 
2003). Seventh, the growth of credit markets for low and middle-income people starting in the 
1980s and accelerating in the 1990s sustained aggregate economic demand whilst a separate 
market of derivatives catered for the very wealthy (Canova 2009). ‘Privatized Keynesianism’ 
represented a new social bargain based on consumer confidence in spite of real falling wages 
(Crouch 2009). Crucial to this model was the expansion of in-work tax credits for low-waged 
workers, which sustained the purchasing power of low-skilled occupational groups without 
affecting core business interests, i.e. without employers having to substantially increase wages 
(Crouch 2009 and 2011, Hay 2010).  This era of ‘Great Moderation’ came to a halt when the 
Great Recession in 2007/08 laid bare the structural flaws of speculative Anglo-American 
capitalism. 
This series of institutional, economic and ideological changes has had a profound impact on the 
nature of corporate elites, with huge implications for working people. In particular, the 
financialization of the economy encouraged the ascent of new financial elites that sought to 
obtain distributional advantages from the ruling of private market organizations. In so doing 
elites shifted the burden of insuring against a rapid decline in income from employers to 
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workers and households, inducing rising income insecurity for the vast majority in both 
countries (Hacker 2006, Milberg and Winkler 2010).  
 
One of the greatest transformations of the last forty years has been the financialization of the 
economy. In the US and the UK, deregulatory reforms enabled the growth in the liquidity of 
capital markets. Financialization refers to a ‘pattern of accumulation in which profit-making 
occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity 
production’ (Krippner 2005: 181).  As firms, especially multinationals, became involved in 
independent financial trading, the frontiers between industrial and money capital became 
blurred (Lapavitsas 2011). The ascendency of finance in corporate governance (Jenkens and 
Meckling 1976) was justified by principal agent theories according to which principals 
(shareholders) and agents (managers) interests are structurally divergent as each party seeks 
to maximize its utility. The need to align the interests of shareholders and managers justified 
the explosion of top executive compensation (bonuses linked to individual financial 
performance) as well as the distribution of stock options to managers.   
 
Changes in the world of corporate elites  
The globalization and deregulation of capital markets resulted in a change in the nature of 
share ownership. In Britain, until the 1980s share ownership was still dominated by domestic 
institutional shareholders, but more recently, there has been a relative decline in the share of 
British institutions and a corresponding rise in the share of non-British ownership, such as 
overseas pension funds and sovereign wealth funds (BIS 2010: 17).  
The rise of institutional investors has also been a prominent feature of American capitalism 
(Useem 1996).  As financial markets became more complex thanks to the range of new 
financial products and instruments (securitization, private equity, structured finance, credit 
default swaps, etc.), institutional investors, who have neither the time nor the capacity to keep 
up with these constant changes,  tended to delegate investment decisions to financial 
intermediaries such as fund managers.  
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This rise of financial intermediaries coincided with a reconfiguration in the traditional inner 
circle of large corporations in the UK and the US (Folkman et al. 2007). Traditionally production 
oriented corporate elites (Useem 1984) were increasingly replaced by senior corporate 
managers with strong financial backgrounds from the early to mid-1980s (Mayer and 
Whittington 1999; see also Maclean, Harvey and Chia 2010). In keeping with Pareto’s 
circulation of elites’ theory, this new finance-oriented business elite was more open and thus 
more diverse than its predecessors. Interestingly, the rise of financial intermediaries was 
associated with the entrance to the business elite of ethnic minority groups as well as women 
in limited but still unprecedented numbers (Domhoff 2010).  
Financial intermediaries are paid on the basis of fees and commissions and are more interested 
in deal-making than long-term investment. Fund managers generate income for themselves 
through fees related to the number of portfolio changes without any long-term value for their 
clients (Wooley 2010:121-144). As corporate performance becomes measured by share value, 
senior partners in the firm, consultants on executive pay, investment bankers, corporate 
lawyers, hedge fund managers, traders and dealers, and financial analysts, have all a stake in 
the ‘economy of permanent restructuring’ because deals (takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, 
securitization) are the source of fees, with senior partners able to ‘capture substantial shares of 
turnover and profits (Folkman et al. 2007: 561-562, Mizruchi 2010). In the US, following the 
relaxation of antitrust legislation raiders outsiders to the world of traditional elites bought 
diversified industries in order to split them up and sell off the parts upon completion of the 
deal. These takeovers ultimately ‘punished’ existing managerial elites for underperformance in 
terms of share prices’ (Davis and Stout 1992; see also Reich 2009). In the City and Wall Street, 
financiers expect to maximise their earnings during a relatively short period of time (10-15 
years), especially as cyclical lay offs are the norm in investment banking (Folkman et al. 2007: 
564). Because the stock market reacts negatively when a firm fails to meet securities analyst 
quarterly earnings forecast, workforce downsizing has become an accepted managerial 
strategy to meet analyst forecasts, either as a way to boost profits or maintain investor 
confidence (Jung 2011, Taylor 2012). As the actors who monitor share prices are fund 
managers under intense pressure to maximize current performance, the shareholder value 
paradigm is played out at all levels of the investment chain.  
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The focus on share prices encouraged the development of a modular production network, 
where firms focus on brand names and intellectual property, leaving contractors to do the 
actual manufacturing and assembling. As a result, ‘corporations have grown less numerous, 
less integrated, less concentrated, more ephemeral, and more constrained by their 
shareholders’ (Davis 2011:1335).The vertically integrated corporation of the past has been 
replaced by an horizontal-network based on a myriad of contractors. This has led to a dis-
aggregation of employment in which attachment of workers to particular firms is more 
tenuous, tenures are shorter, and opportunity for career mobility through clear job ladders are 
becoming the exception rather than the norm (Davis 2009).  
 
 Implications for work and employment  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as the result of financialization and globalization in corporate 
strategies, senior executives made an alliance with financial intermediaries, breaking up the 
traditional Fordist alliance with employees inside the firm (Palpacuer et al. 2011: 564). This has 
three main implications for work and employment.  
First, there has been a development of insecure employment. The rationale for maintaining 
long-term employment relations has been severely undermined, making redundancy as ‘a 
critical life event’ a common experience for both manual and white-collar workers/ for steel 
workers in the 1990s (Gardiner et al. 2009) and for middle managers in the Great Recession 
(Gabriel, Gray and Goregaokar 2013). Arbitrary changes to employment contracts are also 
becoming more common (Clark 2009). In the UK, as shown by Armour, Deakin and Konzelman 
(2003) it is clear that despite the incorporation of EU law (the Collective Redundancy Directive, 
or CRD, and the Acquired Rights Directive, or ARD), into the domestic legal framework, 
corporate law and regulations are tilted in favour of shareholders and managers acting on their 
behalf.  
Second, as the modern corporation relies on a network of subcontractors, we have witnessed 
both a demise of internal labour markets (Capelli 1999) and the development of a temporary 
agency workforce (Forde and Slater 2006, MacKenzie et al. 2010). 
Third, there has been an acceleration of work intensification, where multi-skilling has been 
associated with multi-tasking (Lloyd and Payne 2006). This trend has been particularly acute for 
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middle managers as corporations have adopted increasingly horizontal and lean operational 
structures (McCann, Hassard and Morris 2010). 
What is worth emphasizing is that the Great Recession accentuated the erosion of the social 
compact, as firms responded to the crisis by massive lay offs, pay cuts and underemployment 
(Appelbaum 2011, Lallement 2011). Hopes that the financial crisis would spark a counter-
mobilization of labour interests have not yet materialized, especially in the UK.  
Conclusion 
It has been argued that as a consequence of globalization and financialization of Anglo-
American capitalism in the late 20th century, new business elites specialized in constant deal-
making have replaced the traditionally nation-based, production-oriented managerial elites of 
the post war era, destroying the alliance between capital and labour that had been at the heart 
of the Keynesian compromise. These new elites are dominated by a relatively heterogeneous 
grouping of financial intermediaries and finance-oriented corporate managers who follow a 
logic of short-term rent extraction. The Great Recession has laid bare the decay at the heart of 
incumbent elites, as leading financial giants were shown to have feet of clay. However, the 
absence of a credible alternative to finance-oriented elites has led to a crisis in the circulation 
of elites, with stark implications for work and employment. As a result, a purely finance-driven 
model of corporate governance continues to destroy collective values in the workplace despite 
the rhetoric of team-working and corporate social responsibility.   
So, to paraphrase Lenin, what is to be done?  
 
What is required is a 21st century social contract that would both re-engineer a form of elite 
circulation and promote fairness inside and outside the workplace. This can be referred to as 
good capitalism’ (Hutton, 2012). If were are to admit that lifelong employment belongs to the 
forgone era of a society of organizations (Davis 2009 and 2012), then part of a ‘new’ New Deal 
would entail providing generous unemployment benefits to ensure that laid off workers are 
not starved back into low-paid jobs - the opposite of the Anglo-American workfare model - the 
obligation for large-scale employers to provide training guarantees and health benefits, the 
reintroduction of internal labour markets with clear career ladders, and finally a system of 
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government work guarantee of last resort. Although flexi-security reforms are not a panacea 
for employees, they do represent an alternative to the generalisation of contingent 
employment, intensification of work through automated surveillance and the development of 
workfare policies that have spread like a policy virus (Richardson 2000) across much of the 
OECD over the past thirty years, including in coordinated market economies (McCann, Hassard 
and Morris 2010, Palpacuer et al. 2010).  
For such a new social contract to be negotiated, there may be a need for another circulation of 
elites. The ‘educated bourgeoisie’ has to come forward and convince recalcitrant, finance-
oriented elites. Perhaps we are seeing some green shoots of change. In the US, the 
‘enlightened bourgeoisie’ may finally have understood that self-preservation entails accepting 
to pay higher taxes if they want to overcome the sense of disfranchisement expressed by the 
Occupy Wall Street movement (New York Times 25th October 2012). In this respect, Mr. Obama, 
by standing up to House Republicans in the fiscal cliff standoff (winter 2012-2013), is an ally of 
the moderate wing of corporate America, just like President Roosevelt once was.  In the UK, 
although the coalition government continues to support financial elites, there is a broader 
political debate emerging around the need to adopt a model of responsible capitalism 
(Miliband 25 May 2012).  
The words of Keynes spoken in 1923 (Keynes 1971) echo into the 21st century: ‘I would like to 
warn the gentlemen of the City and High Finance, that if they do not listen in time to the voice 
of reason their days may be numbered… I prophesy that unless they embrace wisdom in good 
time, the system on which they live will work so very ill that they will be overwhelmed by 
irresistible things that they hate much more than the mild and limited remedies offered them 
now.’   
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